The decade of depopulation in Russia. Rybakovsky L

The Demographic Future of Russia and Migration Processes

Early 1990s is marked by the onset in Russia of a period of prolonged depopulation, covering almost all of its subjects. This phenomenon is by no means new. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, for example, France was in a zone of prolonged depopulation. In the XX century. many countries have experienced natural population decline. Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Sweden and a number of other states live in the depopulation mode. Russia simply turned out to be an outsider in the circle of European countries, and its society was not ready for the perception of such a trend in demographic dynamics. From the data given in Table 1, it can be seen that depopulation in Russia is determined by both components of population reproduction — fertility and mortality. In other words, it takes place under double pressure, which distinguishes Russia from Western European countries.

First of all, Russia has the lowest birth rates among European countries, and now their level is significantly lower than in previous decades (table 2). For the last third of the XX century. in Russia, the reproductive regime has sharply worsened, and the total birth rate has declined. In the 1970s each woman of reproductive age on average gave birth to 1.97 children, in the 1980s. even 2.04, which was close to simple reproduction of the population. But in 1991 this figure fell to 1.73, and in 2000 to 1.21. In recent years, the birth rate has increased slightly, but it still makes up less than 60-65% of the level that provides for simple replacement of generations.

At present, Russia in terms of fertility is in the group of economically developed countries (such as Italy, Spain, Greece, Germany, the Czech Republic), in which the total fertility rate is consistently 1.2-1.3. The average European indicator in the second half of the 1990s. amounted to 1.4, while in Russia - 1.3. In Europe, only in Albania there was an expanded reproduction of the population. Consequently, in the 1990s. The prospects for population reproduction in Russia were even worse than in Europe.

In the 1990s in Russia, not only the total birth rate was extremely low, but the number of births was much less than in previous decades. In absolute figures for the period 1991-2000 9.5 million fewer children were born than in 1981-1990, and 7.2 million fewer than in 1971-1980. Birth rate decline in the 1990s was so significant that analogies with the Great Patriotic War were appropriate. The number of children born in 1941-1945 compared with the previous pre-war five-year period, it was 56%. About the same thing happened in 1996-2000, when in relation to 1986-1990. the number of births decreased to 55%. 1

Table 1

The demographic development of Russia in the 1990s.

	T _ Jtj / ^ ttq TL / LPGLGV		Naturally	Ratio of numbers		Total		Expected Pro
Years	TTTLT Yf * G	TI ^ LL at IMCU	naya decline	dead to numbers		coefficient		duty
			growth	born		birth rate (?)		life (years)
1991	1795	1691	104	0,942		1,732		69,01
1992	1588	1807	-219		,138	1,552		67,89
1993	1379	2129	-750		,544		,385	65,14
1994	1408	2301	-893		,634		,400	63,98
1995	1364	2204	-840		,616		,344	64,64
1996	1305	2082	-777		,595		,281	65,89
1997	1260	2016	-756		,600		,230	66,64
1998	1283	1989	-706		,550		,242	67,02
1999	1215	2144	-929		,765	1,171		65,93
2000	1267	2225	-958		,756	1,214		65,27
2001	1312	2255	-943		,719	1,249		65,3
2002	1397	2332	-935		,669	1,322		64,8
2003	1477	2366	-889		,602

Table 2

Annual average births and total fertility rates in Russia

The fundamental reason for the decline in the birth rate in Russia is the completion of the demographic transition by the end of the 20th century. Unlike most countries, in Rossch the transition from large families to small families took place in a relatively short time, saturated with extreme events - the first world and civil wars, collectivization and rapid growth of industry and large cities, coupled with an increase in the employment of women; repression of the late thirties; The Great Patriotic War; and finally the reform of the nineties. In addition to huge casualties (over 13 million who died during the Great Patriotic War and more than 0.5 million were killed in 1937-1938), Russia underwent radical changes in the age-gender and family structures of the population, and the reproductive behavior of the post-war knees.

Another reason is measures to stimulate the birth rate in the 1980s, which contributed to the repayment of the demographic wave, the depression that formed during the war years, and, on the other hand, led to the emergence of a new wave in peacetime5, the crest of which fell on 1983 -1987 Those who happened to be born concentrated in a short period of time. As a result, women who completed their reproductive plans in the 1990s. turned into a kind of "reproductive ballast." The resulting increase in children born in the 1980s. (approximately 2.0–2.5 million people), by the end of the 1990s it turned out to be completely “eaten up”.

The third reason is the nature of the socio-economic transformation, the decline in the level of well-being of the population, on the one hand, and the growth of demand, a higher standard of living, especially among young people, on the other. As a result, a significant part of young men and women are distracted from reproductive activities (shuttles, labor migrants, etc.), trying to create material comfort for themselves or simply survive in market conditions. In the first half of the 1990s. there were at least 10-15 million people or almost 30% of the population aged 20 to 40 years. The attempt to earn "good" money lasts for many years, which does not contribute to the implementation of reproductive plans. This also includes the departure of young women to work abroad. In the 1990s in Western Europe alone, roughly 3-4% of Russian women between the ages of 18 and 24 provided paid sexual services. Nowadays, not only the “brain drain” from Russia, which depletes the intellectual potential of the nation, is preserved, but the “aesthetic” appearance of the people is worsening. It is appropriate to recall the novel of A.S. Novikova Priboy "Captain of the first rank". It explains how the breed of noble masters improved. Beauties from the poor willingly married any rich freak. "From such a married couple, children will no longer be such freaks as their father. ... Children will grow up and in turn marry beautiful women. In this manner, a special, master breed is obtained." Traveling abroad of young and beautiful women from Russia is accompanied not only by a decrease in the birth rate, but also, if we follow the logic of the author of the novel, will lead to a deterioration in the aesthetic quality of the population.

The fourth reason, and it is gradually gaining strength - what is happening, to a significant extent under the influence of the media, is a change in reproductive attitudes, the introduction of Western models of family, reproductive and sexual behavior into the minds of Russian youth. In the 1990s the proportion of unregistered, so-called civil marriages increased (in 1994 there were 6.6%, and in 2002 already 9%), the number of illegitimate births increased, the age at which sexual activity began was reduced. So, in 1990 the proportion of illegitimate births was 14.6%, in 1995 - 21.1%, and in 2002 reached 29.5%. At the same time, today's Russian youth is more serious about creating "family nests" and giving birth to children. First - the solution of material problems (the acquisition of housing, its improvement, the purchase of a car, education and profession, and therefore, well-paid work), and only then the expansion of the family.

The most negative consequence of systemic, primarily economic crisis in Russia there was an increase in mortality. In the 1990s the number of deaths exceeded the level of the 1980s. by 4.9 million people, and compared with the seventies increased by 7.4 million. If we take the age-related mortality rates in the 1980s. and the number of deaths at the same ages in the 1990s, you can get an excess of deaths in the last decade compared to the previous one. This surplus, or rather supermortality in 1991-2000. amounted to about 3-3.5 million people, and together with the losses attributable to the triennium of the XXI century - about 4 million people. For comparison, we note that over-mortality during the Great Patriotic War, including the death of the population in besieged Leningrad, amounted to approximately 4.2 million people. Among the dead in the peaceful nineties, the proportion of deaths preventable in other socio-economic conditions increased.

A peculiar dynamics of the life expectancy of the population of Russia in the seventies and nineties. In the sixties on this indicator, the country was at the level of European states. But already in 1971-1980. life expectancy has decreased by 0.82 years compared with the previous decade. In the 1980s it increased by 0.44 years compared to the previous decade, but nevertheless remained 0.38 years lower than in the most favorable sixties in this respect. In fact, the last 35- ^ 0 years, life expectancy was in a stagnant state.

All this happened against the background of a rapid increase in life expectancy in developed countries: Japan, USA, Canada, Germany, France, Sweden, etc. The life expectancy of the population of both sexes in the early sixties was 65-67 years in Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and several other European countries, whereas in Russia it was almost 69 years. But already in the 1980s. life expectancy in these and other developed countries exceeded the level of Russia by five to seven years behind this time. In the nineties, the average life expectancy for the entire period in Russia decreased by 2.65 years and at the beginning of the XXI century compared to the previous decade. was a little over 65 years old, i.e. was less than in the main European countries for 12-14 years. This indicator lagged 7 years from the average European level. In 2001, life expectancy for both sexes in Russia was lower than in Great Britain, Germany, Italy, France by 13-14 years, than in Canada and Sweden - by 15 years. According to the UN, now in Russia compared with other European countries, including countries that emerged in the post-Soviet space, the lowest life expectancy.

Russia is not only a European country, but also an Asian one. In Asia, its place in the distribution of life expectancy is also far from the best. Among the 50 Asian countries, Russia is in the worst third. In terms of life expectancy, Russia's "neighbors" are Indonesia, Guatemala, Mongolia, Morocco, Egypt, all the states of Central Asia, etc. In the group of eastern regions of Russia only in Western Siberia life expectancy is close to its average level throughout foreign Asia, while in Eastern Siberia it is lower by 3-4 years, in the Far East - by 1-2 years. In 2001, this indicator in Russia was lower than in Japan by 17 years.

The underlying cause of rising mortality was the effects of the 1990s reforms. - the collapse of the health care system and sanitary surveillance (forgotten cholera, tuberculosis, other diseases that were almost completely eliminated in the Soviet years appeared); the high cost of effective and the distribution of fake drugs; deterioration of balance and diet (partial replacement of meat products, animal oil, fish for potatoes, cereals, flour products); inaccessibility for most of the population of good rest and leisure; neglect of labor protection and safety standards, especially in the private sector; “liberalization” of road traffic; lack of effective control over goods produced and imported into the country and saturation of the consumer market with falsified food and alcohol; stressful situations, which resulted in an increase in suicides and mental disorders; deterioration of the crime situation, the spread of drug addiction, etc. The number of suicides was especially significant in 1994-1995, exceeding a total of 120 thousand. Having begun to decline since 1995, the number of suicides in 1999, after the population lost their savings again. In 2003, it was 24% higher than the number of homicides, or both, along with poisoning, death from accidents and injuries, including traveling, exceeded 335 thousand cases, firmly taking second place among the main causes of death.

The integral effect of rising mortality and declining birth rates led to a significant natural decline in the population. During the depopulation decade (1992-2001), 7.8 million less people were born in the country than died, while in the 1980s and 1970s. it was the other way round: the number of births exceeded the number of deaths by 7.6 and 7.8 million people, respectively. Therefore, if in 1971-1990. the population of the country increased during each decade due to a natural increase of almost 8 million people, then over the ten years of depopulation it as a result of natural decline decreased by the same 8 million people. Figuratively speaking, in the nineties Russia lost the same part of the population as it lived in seven millionaire cities - Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Volgograd, Yekaterinburg, Kazan, Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk.

In 1999-2000 the population of Russia decreased annually by 6.5 people per each thousand inhabitants of the country, while in Belarus this indicator was 4.9-4.1% about, Bulgaria - 4.7-5.1%, Hungary - 4.8- 3.8, not to mention Italy, where the natural decline was 0.7-0.8 and Sweden - 0.7-0.3% s. Regarding the population, a large natural decrease was observed only in Ukraine (7.0-7.5% o). Thus, Russia is distinguished not only by a natural population decline (in the last 5 years, 900-950 thousand people a year), but also by the depth of depopulation, which is more significant than in all other countries, with the exception of Ukraine.

Table 3

Periods of decline in the number of stable population with corresponding indicators of its reproduction 2

Net reproduction rate	Total fertility rate	Level of reduction in the initial population
		Up to 75%	Up to 50%
0,7 0,6 0,5	1,480 1,270 1,060	After 20 years After 14 years After 11 years	After 49 years After 34 years After 25 years

At present, Russia in terms of fertility is a European power, located in the group of advanced developed countries. In terms of the total fertility rate, it ranks among one third of the countries with the lowest values \u200b\u200bof this indicator (Italy, Spain, Greece, Germany, the Czech Republic, only 11 countries, where the total fertility rate is consistently 1.2-1.3). At the same time, in terms of life expectancy, Russia firmly occupies a position among underdeveloped countries (among Asian countries - 16th out of 50). Only when compared with African states does it look more or less normal: if you were there, it could take the top ten among 50 countries. In a word, in Russia at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st centuries, a unique mode of population reproduction was formed: European birth rate and African-Asian mortality.

A statement of the reasons for the deterioration of the demographic situation is only one of the issues. Another, logically following it, is an assessment of what such demographic development can lead to if society does not realize the significance of the impending threat. The demographic future of Russia can be represented in two ways: as the dynamics of a hypothetical and real population. In the first case, it is important to establish what reduction in population can be at a real level of reproduction that does not provide for simple replacement of generations. In 1999, the total birth rate in the whole country was 1.215, and the net reproduction rate was 0.551; in 2002, the total birth rate increased to 1.322. The calculations of the rates of possible reduction of the hypothetical population are given in table 3. With the reproduction rates established by the end of the 20th century, the country's population would have halved in one third of a century and by 2033-2034. would not exceed 97 million people. But this is a "virtual" view of the future of the country. Numerous forecasts of the demographic future of Russia, based on existing indicators of the birth rate, mortality and age and sex structure of the population living in the country, speak of what can happen and is already being realized in reality. The likely picture is rather gloomy. Note that the aggregated forecasts made by the Federal State Statistics Service (FSGS) represent the estimated population, which takes into account changes in both natural and migration movements. They adopted a positive migration balance, which, of course, underestimates the pace of population decline (table4).

Table 4

Predicted estimates of the population of Russia 3

(initial base - 2000, million people)

	2005	2010	2015	2025	2050
Goskomstat of the Russian Federation, 1996. Goskomstat of the Russian Federation, 1999. UN, 1994. UN, 1998.	143,0 142,1 144,2	140,3 138,7 143,1	134,0 142,0	137,9	129,8 121,3

Table 5

Change in the components of demographic dynamicsin Russia(thousand people)

Years	Total increase	Natural	Migratory	CRMS *
	decrease (-)	increase, decrease (-)	growth
1992	-31	-207	176	698
1993	-308	-738	430**	504
1994	-60	-870	810	290
1995	-330	-832	502**	401
1996	-474	-818	344	451
1997	-398	-750	353	390
1998	-411	-697	285	415
1999	-768	-923	165**	566
2000	-740	-959	214	406***
2001	-865	-937	72	626 4
2002	-855	-935	80**	578
2003	-796	-889	93	728

According to forecasts made in 2000 by the United Nations Population Services, from 20 countries with a population of 140,000 or more, the population will drop by 39 by 2050. In this list, Russia ranks 6th in terms of population decline. It is ahead of Estonia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Georgia and Guyana. But in terms of the scale of losses, Russia comes first. By the middle of the century, all 39 countries, according to UN forecasts, will lose almost 152 million, of which Russia will account for 41.2 million people (27%), Ukraine - 19.6 million, Japan - 17.9 million, Italy, Germany and Spain combined - 34.4 million people. The point, of course, is not the accuracy of the numbers, but the direction and scale of the demographic dynamics. But it is such that by the middle of this century, the population of Russia may be less than 100 million people.

Naturally, demographic dynamics are determined not only by the nature of reproduction processes, but also depend on external migration. In recent decades, depopulation processes in many European countries have been smoothed to some extent through external migration. Migration replaced the natural population decline in whole or in part. These countries include Russia (table 5).

External migration growth of 1992-2003 reached 3.5 million people, which offset approximately 45% of the natural decline. From the beginning of depopulation (1992) until the present, external migration with a constant positive balance has never compensated for a completely natural population decline. Moreover, if in the first half of the 1990s. migration growth made up for 60-90% of the natural decline, then at the turn of the century the migration balance fell sharply and began to compensate for only a tenth of the natural loss (in 2001, 8.3%, in 2002 9.4%, in 2003 10 ,five%). And the point here is not that in the post-Soviet space the migration potential of the Russian-speaking population decreased, but in the migration policy that Russia pursued in the nineties. She did not take advantage of favorable conditions. Due to discrimination (laws on citizenship, the state language, suffrage, etc.) in the states that emerged in the post-Soviet space, the Russian-speaking, mainly of Slavic origin, the population was ready to massively return to their historical homeland. The obstacles it encountered quickly cleared the migration impulses of the Russian-speaking diasporas even in countries with a different ethnic culture.

But even with a decrease in the influx of the Russian-speaking population, primarily Russians, from the countries of the new foreign countries, migration still partially offset the decrease in the number of state-forming ethnic groups that occurred during the census period (1989-2002). At the time of the last census (October 2002), the number of Russians in Russia was 116 million, compared to 120 million in 1989. During the intercensal period, due to migration growth, the number of Russians in Russia increased by 3.4 million. Consequently, as a result of depopulation, the number of Russians in Russia decreased not by 4, but by 7.4 million. A similar thing happened with a number of other ethnic groups. But that's not all. Due to a change in their nationality, only the Ukrainians increased the number of Russians by 1.2 million. Moreover, the number of Russians as a result of the excess of the number of deaths over the number of births decreased by almost 9 million people, i.e. by 7.5%, while the entire population of Russia during this time decreased by 1.1%.

The reduction in migration flows to Russia, together with the decline in the birth rate, affected not only the quantitative, but also the qualitative parameters of the population. The decrease in the population, which does not come from external, but from internally immanent factors, is always accompanied to some extent by demographic aging. The specifics of Russia in the 1990s. consisted in the fact that here the aging of the population occurred only as a result of the decline in the birth rate, while the increasing mortality of the adult population, especially in the middle of the decade, restrained this process, i.e. contributed to rejuvenation. In the same direction, external migration also influenced, since among migrants the proportion of people of young working age is always higher.

Reduction by the end of the 1990s. the influx of migrants and the balance of migration nullified
the role of this factor in population growth and rejuvenation. Naturally, Socra
increase in migration growth and increase in life expectancy
(if this process begins) will further accelerate demographic aging, as a result of
which will increase the demographic burden of people aged
those older than able-bodied (table 6).
Table 6
Distribution of the resident population of Russia by major age groups(for the beginning of the year)

Years	Average age	Younger than working age	Able-bodied	Older than working age
	(years old)	age in %	age in%	age, in%
1979 (census)	34,0	23,3	60,4	16,3
1989 (census)	34,7	24,5	56,9	18,5
1999 (estimate)	37,1	20,7	58,5	20,8
2009 (forecast)		15,0	63,5	21.5 h
2016 (forecast)		15,3	59,9	24,8

.
If at the beginning of 1999 there were 356 old-age pensioners per 1,000 people of working age, then by 2016 they will be 415. At present, even with a lower demographic burden on the part of old-age pensioners, their financial situation is deplorable, not to say stronger. Moreover, over the years of reform, their social status has sharply worsened and something incredible for Russian traditions has happened: the younger generations have ceased to respect the older population. But the country has no future when young generations do not provide material and spiritual existence for those who gave them life.

The decrease in population and its aging can be arbitrarily called: depopulation, reduction in demographic potential, decrepitude of the nation, its extinction, degeneration, etc. The point is not in words, but in the fact that the modern character of demographic development in all cases is a warning to the peoples of Russia. In the predictable future, the majority of the peoples living in the regions may disappear, of which, over the course of a long history, the multinational Russian state was formed around the geopolitical core - the Moscow Principality.

World history is full of examples when numerous for their time and seemingly invincible peoples disappeared without a trace. The most ancient powerful state of the Assyrians in the Near East in the 7th century. BC e. was captured by other peoples, some of its inhabitants were exterminated, and the other, mixed with the conquerors, disappeared along with their state. On the steppes between the Don and the Danube in the X century. Pechenegs inhabited, often attacking ancient Russia. At the end of the XI century. under pressure from the Polovtsy they were forced out to the lower Danube, there they mixed with the Polovtsy and disappeared as such. Before the colonization of America, up to 50 million Indians were believed to have lived in its southern and northern parts. Exploring the open spaces North AmericaThe colonists exterminated many tribes. Now the Indians in this part of the mainland are several hundred thousand.

History shows that in the past, the disappearance of peoples was associated with their conquest and extermination, assimilation among the victors, or simply expulsion from their historical habitats. In the third millennium, Russia sets a historical precedent when large nations in peacetime, without external influence, can disappear only because the reproduction of the population has “narrowed” to a level that does not guarantee its survival.

To prevent this from happening, Russia must mobilize all possible sources and factors of population stabilization. This goal is formulated in the Concept of Demographic Development of the Russian Federation approved by the Government of the country. It should be noted that in 2000-2002. the number of births began to increase - in 2002 they amounted to 1.4 million children born versus 1.2 million in 1999. In 2003, the number of births increased by another 80 thousand. Some tend to associate this process exclusively with the stabilization of the economy, others rightly attribute it to shifts in the age structure, which is subject to the influence of the so-called "demographic waves." At the beginning of the XXI century. a numerically larger than before generation of women entered reproductive age, which led to an increase in the number of births. In 1999, in the average annual population, the proportion of women in reproductive age was 26.8%, and in 2003 already 27.7%. But the structural factor is not the only reason. Another is associated with a slight increase in the number of children born to one woman of reproductive age. In a word, there has been a slight, but improvement in the birth rate. Of course, it affected what the population began to feel the emerging stabilization in the country associated with economic recovery. The phenomenon of belief in a change for the better needs to be studied, since it already happened in 1986-1987, when Soviet people believed in a change for the better, promised by M. Gorbachev.

The slow birth rate that has been going on for 4 years, while maintaining a high mortality rate, will not save Russia from the natural population decline. Mortality reduction needed. Reducing it to the parameters of the 1980s. could save a life by at least 400-500 thousand people, which would have not only demographic, but also enormous humanitarian significance. Mobilizing reserves to reduce mortality from preventable causes does not require huge investments. Nevertheless, the begun growth in the birth rate, even if supplemented by a reduction in mortality, will not be able to influence a radical change in the population reproduction regime and ensure a positive demographic dynamics. Therefore, in the first decade of the XXI century. the rate of decline in the country's population will be largely determined by the scale of the influx of migrants from abroad.

Despite the decrease in the number of peoples of Russia (Russians, Tatars, Komi, Kabardins, etc.) remaining in the new foreign countries, their number is still quite large. According to the 1989 census, 28 million people lived in the former Soviet republics, and now they are from 20 to 22 million (the number has decreased due to natural decline, migration outflow to Russia and other countries of the new and old foreign countries, as well as changes nationality) The reduction in the scale of migration of Russian and other titular peoples of Russia from the states of the new foreign countries and the decrease in the migration growth of the Russian population as a whole are caused, on the one hand, by the liberalization of the attitude towards the Russian-speaking population (linguistic and other indulgences) and its integration into the local ethnocultural environment, especially that part of it which, to some extent, is mixed with indigenous people, and on the other hand, due to the fact that migrants still do not receive proper understanding and support in their historical homeland due to the lack of a consistent migration policy regarding compatriots who have remained abroad.

In its migration policy, Russia does not take into account not only its own, but also foreign experience. And the experience, for example, of post-war Germany, France, Japan and some other countries testifies to the enormous political and economic gain of the states that returned their compatriots from the territories they left. France, under General de Gaulle, made the historically correct decision to leave North Africa. Being in a difficult economic situation, she relocated 1.5-2 million French people to her homeland, although this put a heavy burden on the budget of the country with a population of less than 45 million people. A defeated Germany with a devastated economy returned more than 10 million ethnic Germans to the original borders of the Third Reich. This increased the country's population by 15-20%. Ruined Japan after the end of World War II returned from the occupation regions (China, Korea, Southeast Asia and South Sakhalin) about 4.5 million people, which increased its population by 5-6%.

The influx of the Russian-speaking population from the new foreign countries in the current decade, with the corresponding migration policy of Russia, could amount to several million people. The real scale of migration will depend on the policies pursued by the states of the new foreign countries with regard to the Russian-speaking population (the status of the Russian language, the filling of managerial posts, education, etc.), and on the migration policy of Russia with respect to compatriots remaining in the post-Soviet space. But in any case, the influx of migrants from the new foreign countries will significantly slow down the decline in the population of Russia. In subsequent years, the migration potential may be completely exhausted, as the population that has grown up and has become pensioners and that is born and undergoes socialization outside the historical homeland are unlikely to emigrate to Russia.

A more restrained migration policy should be pursued in relation to immigrants from the old foreign countries. Obviously, the Russian state without an influx of foreign work force cannot exploit its natural resources on a large scale. Russia is the largest country in the territory in the world, it owns 1/8 of the globe, huge agricultural land, among which are the best black earth in the world. This gives her the opportunity to be self-sufficient, to form a balance of food and agricultural raw materials through its own production. Russia is a forest country, which fully provides its needs with commercial wood, raw materials for the production of pulp, cardboard, paper, etc. It has colossal world reserves of fresh water (in Baikal alone, the volume of fresh water is 23 thousand cubic kilometers, which is approximately one fifth of the world reserves). It accounts for one fifth (21%) of world reserves of resources, which is more than specific gravity its territory (12.6%), not to mention the country's share in the world population (2.4%). Russia owns 45% of the world's natural gas reserves, 13% - oil, 23% - coal, etc. The estimated reserves of Russia's resources are estimated at 140 trillion. US dollars. Given the value of Russia's gross domestic product in 2002, these resources will be enough for about 400 years, and with a doubling of GDP, no less than two centuries. That Russia is one of richest countries peace is its plus. And the minus is that up to the XXI century. most of the country's territory remained underdeveloped and poorly populated. At present, the population density indices of the eastern regions of Russia are approximately 30 times lower than the average population level of the entire Asian continent. But the old-settled part of the country is not so densely populated. Its population level is more than 2 times lower than in the rest of Europe.

Historical experience shows that a country cannot preserve its territories if they are poorly populated and not protected. Enough examples to confirm this thesis. Two events, one in the 19th and the other in the 20th centuries, are the most prominent. The first historical lesson is the civilized loss of Alaska (over 1.5 million square kilometers), sold to the United States in 1867. But there were not only buyers on Russian territory. She always attracted invaders. Hitler, preparing an attack on the USSR, explained that the expansion of living space for the German people can only happen at the expense of Russia. According to this doctrine, after the Nazi capture of the USSR, it was planned to destroy 46-51 million Russians and other Slavic peoples within a few years. But Russian, like other Soviet territories at that time, turned out to be not only a tidbit for the invaders, but also one of the factors due to which the quick victory of the Nazis turned into their crushing defeat. Russia must not forget the bitter experience even in the face of a radical change international relations, good neighborly coexistence, strategic partnership and comprehensive globalization.

In our opinion, what has been said should be fully taken into account when considering long-term immigration programs and pursuing an appropriate migration policy. This is of particular importance for the sparsely populated eastern regions of the country. There, poorly developed Russian territories border on densely populated areas of China, whose population continues to grow rapidly. Already, from 100 to 1,000 million people live in the regions of China bordering the south of the Far East. The border regions, primarily Primorye and Amur Region, will be able to avoid the fate of Alaska, Texas, Kosovo and several other regions of the world only by consistently pursuing a policy that would meet both the national interests of Russia and the national interests of China. The foundation of this policy is the strength and large-scale economic relations between countries doomed to live in the neighborhood. A special block of this policy should be a long-term migration program. Its essence is the creation of such prerequisites that will allow immigration, especially illegal, to be replaced by temporary labor migration. The goal of attracting labor from China could be joint mutually beneficial exploitation. natural resources Siberia, the Far East, other regions of the country. With such a formulation, the question of who should settle in the Far East - immigrants from neighboring countries or the titular peoples of Russia, and the question of the exploitation of what natural resources China can connect the prospects of its economic development with will be resolved.

Demographic expansion in the future is possible not only from the countries of the Pacific region. It is also likely in the area of \u200b\u200bthe southern borders of Russia. Outside of them, a powerful community of Islamic states is being formed, some of which will sooner or later be drawn into the states - the former union republics of the USSR. In the countries of this community, a population is rapidly growing, the employment conditions of which are limited due to low land and the agricultural orientation of the economy. By the beginning of the XXI century. In Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, other Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, there were approximately 450 million people, mostly of Islamic faith. According to UN forecasts, by 2050 their population will reach one billion, and in each of the last three countries the number of inhabitants will exceed the Russian one.

The population explosion expected in the first half of the century in a number of countries (in Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Iraq and some other countries will double), the concentration of multi-million-strong armies of the unemployed in the context of the Islamization of the former Soviet republics and the strengthening of their ties with neighboring Muslim states can significantly change the geopolitical situation in the south Russia, cause a powerful migration expansion. In this geopolitically important area, an active migration policy should also be pursued, not limited only to the issuance of migration cards.

Most likely, without an annual migration inflow (its value will depend on the size of the natural decline and dynamics labor resources) cannot be achieved stabilization of the population of Russia and maintaining labor potential at a level sufficient for sustainable economic development. The solution of these two interrelated tasks comes down to both the reception of migrants - future citizens of Russia, primarily from countries of the new foreign countries, and the attraction of labor migrants with certain social parameters for a reasonable period of time from the old abroad.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. 
   Age structure of the population of the RSFSR. According to the 1989 All-Union Population Census
   Goskomstat of the RSFSR. M., 1990.
2. 
   Demographic Yearbook of Russia. Goskomstat of the Russian Federation. M., 2001.
3. 
   Demographic Yearbook of Russia. Goskomstat of the Russian Federation. M., 1996.
4. 
   Demographic conceptual dictionary. Ed. L. L. Rybakovsky.M., 2003.
5. 
   The demographic future of Russia. Ed. L.L. Rybakovskyand G.N. Karelova.M.,
   2001.
6. 
   The population of the USSR for 70 years. Ed. LL Rybakovsky.M., 1988. "- -"
7. 
   Estimated population of the Russian Federation until 2016 (Stat.
   newsletter). Goskomstat of the Russian Federation. M., 2000.
8. 
   Russian statistical yearbook. The official publication. M., 2003.
9. 
   Rybakovsky LL.Applied demography. M, 2003.
10. 
    Ryazantsev S.The impact of migration on the socio-economic development of Europe: modern
    other trends. Stavropol, 2001.
11. 
    Stabilization of the population of Russia (possible directions of demographic
    politicians). Ed. Karelova G.N. and Rybakovsky L. L.M., 2001.
12. 
    The population of the Russian Federation by gender and age as of January 1, 1999.
    Goskomstat of the Russian Federation. M., 1999.

1 The work was carried out with financial support from the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation (project 02-03-18144-a).

2 Calculations performed by V.M. Arkhangelsk, they abstract from the characteristics of the age structure of the population and assume that it has stabilized.

3 Medium options accepted.

4 CRMC - the coefficient of the effectiveness of migration ties, the ratio of the number of dropouts to arrivals per mille, the rate of feedback used in pre-revolutionary resettlement activities.

Russian demographer, sociologist and economist. Born in 1931 in the city of Spassk, Primorsky Territory. In 1953 he graduated from the Kuibyshev Planning Institute. Doctor of Economic Sciences since 1971 (specialty regional studies), professor - since 1977 (specialty - demography). Since 1959 he has been working at the Academy of Sciences, since 1974 - at the Institute for Social and Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is currently the main research fellow at this institute. He was awarded the medal "For Valiant Labor", the medal of the Order "For Merit to the Fatherland", II degree, the Order of Friendship.

Rybakovsky L.L. published in many magazines, encyclopedias, reference books, etc. more than 200 scientific works, including 10 copyright monographs and over 30 sections in collective books, including textbooks and study guides on demography, population migration, sociology and labor economics. A number of works have been translated and published in Spanish, French, German, English and other languages. The most significant author's monographs: "Regional analysis of migrations" (1973), "Methodological issues of population forecasting" (1978), "Population of the Far East for 150 years" (1990), "Population migration: forecasts, factors, politics" (1987). The last work was awarded the VDNKh silver medal.

Recently, the monographs “Human Losses of the USSR and Russia in the Great Patriotic War” (2001), “Applied Demography” (2003), “Migration of the Population. Issues of Theory” (2003), as well as collective works edited by him “Demographic Future” Of Russia "(2001)," Stabilization of the population of Russia (possibilities and directions of demographic policy) "(2001)," Demographic conceptual dictionary "(2003)," Demography "(2005)," Strategy of the demographic development of Russia "(2005)," Practical Demography "(2005).

The main scientific ideas developed by L. Rybakovsky relate to the theory of population migration. The author proposes a classification of the population depending on the length of stay in the territory. This classification includes three basic concepts: "local natives", "old-timers" and "new settlers". Of great importance for the regional analysis of migration is proposed in the late 1960s. intensity factor of inter-district migration links (KIMS). The value of this coefficient does not depend on the population of both exit areas and places of migration. The advantage of this indicator is that it allows you to determine the true value of inter-district migration ties.

A significant contribution to the theory of migration was the development of the concept of the three stages of the migration process. The fundamental provisions of the concept are reduced to the separation of concepts such as readiness for migration (mobility) and resettlement (the realization of this readiness). The introduction of sociological knowledge into migration issues, in particular, ideas about projective and real behavior, potential migration and migration mobility, is associated with these concepts.

New for demographic science is the proposed L. L. Rybakovsky ethno-demographic method of estimating human losses for the USSR and individual parts of this state. The essence of the ethno-demographic method is that casualties for the countries of the former USSR are determined from the losses of those ethnic groups that are state-forming.

The calculations of Russia's loss of life in the Great Patriotic War, performed by the ethnodemographic method, showed that the RSFSR accounted for approximately 13.2 million. human liveslost in 1941-1945, including 5.8 million military personnel, 7.4 million civilians. The same method was used to calculate the number of people who were repressed, including the number of political prisoners sentenced to death and the extreme mortality of 1937-1938 who fell to Russia.

Major publications

• Rybakovsky L.L. Problems of population formation in the Far East (monograph). - Khabarovsk, 1969 .-- 200 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. Population of the Far East for 100 years (monograph). - M .: Nauka, 1969 .-- 180 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. Regional analysis of migrations (monograph). - M .: Statistics, 1973. - 159 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. Methodological foundations of population forecasting (monograph). - M.: Statistics, 1978. - 208 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. Population migration: forecasts, factors, politics (monograph). - M .: Nauka, 1987 .-- 199 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. The population of the Far East (monograph). - M.: Science, 1990.-170 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. Human losses of the USSR and Russia in the Great Patriotic War (monograph). - M.: Catalog, 2001 .-- 192 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. Migration (issue 5) Stages of the migration process (monograph). - M., 2001 .-- 159 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. Applied demography (monograph). - M.: ISPI RAS, 2003.-206 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. Population migration (theory issues) (monograph). - M.: ISPI RAS, 2003 .-- 238 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. and others. Reproduction of labor resources of the Far East (monograph). - M., 1969. - 125 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. and others. Territorial features of the population of the RSFSR (monograph). - M .: Statistics, 1976. - 230 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. and other Social factors and characteristics of the migration of the population of the USSR (monograph). - M .: Nauka, 1978.- 141 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. et al. Demographic processes in a socialist society (monograph). - M.: Finance and Statistics, 1981. - 295 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. and others. The population of the USSR for 70 years (monograph). - M .: Nauka, 1988.214 s.
• Rybakovsky L.L. et al. Demographic future of Russia (monograph). - M.: Human Rights, 2001. - 51 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. et al. Stabilization of the population of Russia (monograph). - M. Publishing House of TsSP, 2001. - 262 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. et al. Demographic development of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug: situation, forecast, policy (monograph). - Khanty-Mansiysk, 2002.-212s.
• Rybakovsky L.L. etc. Demographic development Samara region: Problems and policies. - M .: Globus, 2003 .-- 206 p.
• Rybakovsky L.L. et al. Demographic conceptual dictionary. - M.: TsSP, 2003.-351 p.

(Social. 2001. No. 6. P. 85? 95)

Rybakovsky Leonid Leonidovich, Doctor of Economics, Professor. Institute for Social and Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The worst results of wars, of any scale, are casualties. Life - from the point of view of human morality - is priceless. But from the standpoint of politicians who push people to kill each other, victims are only the inevitable result of wars, and war, Clausewitz noted, is a continuation of politics by other means. Not to mention the early times, even in the 20th century, human losses in wars were considered and are considered not as ruined lives, but as lost potential. Human memory did not save information about hundreds of thousands, millions of soldiers and civilians who died during the time of ancient, medieval, modern wars, keeping the names of Macedonian, Caesar, Barbarossa, Napoleon, other commanders, on whose conscience these victims.

After any war, and sometimes during ongoing battles, consider casualties. No exception World War II. Both the victors and the defeated already in the first post-war years knew, at least, their own human losses. The loss figures published at that time have changed little so far. In 1946, Germany’s losses in World War II were estimated at 6.5 million. This figure is being specified, but most of the amendments do not exceed 20 percent. Another thing is the loss of life of the USSR. The loss figure, published in the Soviet Union in 1946, increased by almost 4 times by the beginning of the 90s. She remains the subject of controversy, which is natural. Sometimes the losses are underestimated, however, insignificantly- by 12 - 13%. At the same time, those who are not tired of humiliating their homeland continue to overestimate the human losses of the USSR, often by 1.5 to 2 times. And without these overstatements, the losses are terrible in scale - almost 14% of the country's pre-war population. In the temporarily occupied territories, every fifth resident was killed or was destroyed. Soviet people fought together with the enemy, died together on the battlefields, in concentration camps, at the hands of punishers, etc. During and after the war, neither victory nor general losses were shared. Before the collapse of the USSR, there was no need for estimates of casualties for individual republics or nationalities. Actually, they are still missing, at least for Russia. The need for them, meanwhile, is obvious. Not in order to show whose contribution to the overall victory is more significant, or who lost more people in the common struggle against the aggressor, but only to recreate the history of the Russian population, to assess the damage to its demographic development.

Prerequisites for the assessment of human losses

for parts of the country

Calculations of losses throughout the Soviet Union are fraught with difficulties that increase many times when estimates are made for individual parts of the state. Estimates of human loss in such cases involve often fatal information gaps. When guns rattle, statistics are the last thing they think about. And without this, war leaves a lot of unknown.

Regardless of which method of estimating human losses is used: the direct calculation method, the method of demographic balance, the ethno-demographic method, not to mention the method of proportional distribution of losses, it should proceed from a single, common for the USSR size of human losses. Otherwise, the sum of the estimates of the loss of life of now independent states will be unthinkable. In subsequent judgments and calculations, we proceed from the total losses of 27 million people. The irretrievable losses of military personnel are accepted at 8.7 million. To share civilian population accounting for 18.3 million people. Adopting a different, slightly smaller figure for total losses, for example - 26.6 million, we come to an estimate of civilian losses of 17.9 million people, which is only 0.4 million less (1.5%).

Regardless of the method of determining human losses, it inevitably depreciated by the incompleteness and inaccuracy of the source information. We are talking about official data on the population on the eve and at the end of the war, its natural movement during the war years, information about the deceased civilian population collected by the Extraordinary State Commission (ChGK) in the liberated areas, etc. There are discrepancies even when different authors use the same source of information. Example ? estimates for Leningrad. It is still unknown how many civilians died in the besieged city. For Leningrad and the region A.A. Shevyakov cites the death toll of 1.4 million people. According to P. Polyan, a little more than 700 thousand people died. Both authors use materials from ChGK. According to D. Likhachev, at least 2 million people died during the blockade in the city: many residents of rural areas fled there from the advancing enemy. Nobody took them into account, although they are among the dead.

Not absolutely reliable and the number of dead military personnel. S.N. Mikhalev believes that the value of irretrievable losses of military personnel is approximately 2.2 million more than that proposed by the military department. Without going into a dispute, we note that the total amount of human losses calculated by the method of demographic balance does not change from an increase or decrease in these losses, although the ratio of casualties to military personnel and civilians changes. In the first case, is it? and?, in the second case - 2/5 and 3/5. The third relation should also be cited, which is obtained by using S.N. Mikhalev estimate total losses Soviet Union 23.6 million people. With the loss of military personnel of 10.9 million, 12.7 million remains for the share of the civilian population. Then the ratio of the deaths of the civilian population and military personnel is almost 1 to 1 (54 and 46 percent).

The plausibility of the first of the relationships is confirmed by this consideration. In Germany, Hungary and Romania, hostilities lasted 4-6 months. There was no deliberate extermination of the population, as was the case in Poland, Yugoslavia and the USSR. The ratio in the losses of military personnel and civilians in them is 1: 1. In addition, the main battles took place on Soviet territory, where along with soldiers, the Soviet, not German, population was killed. In our country, the occupation and destruction of the civilian population lasted 2.5-3 years. Many settlements passed from hand to hand several times; some were destroyed along with the population during the fighting and punitive operations. As a result of military operations and punitive operations of fascist troops against partisans in the occupied territory, 1710 cities and more than 70 thousand rural settlements were completely or partially destroyed and burned. Add months of siege, blockade, bombing and shelling of cities. These are hundreds of thousands, millions of lives. Consequently, the ratio of dead military personnel and civilians in the USSR cannot be the same as in Germany and allied countries.

Large distortions in the estimates of human losses for individual parts of a single state are introduced by internal migration. Information on the size of the migrated population from the areas from which our troops retreated is extremely contradictory. They vary in the range of 10 - 25 million. So, according to G. Kumanev, 500 thousand people left Karelia at the beginning of the war, while the population of this republic in 1939 was 470 thousand.

Information from the USSR Goskomstat on evacuated during the war years includes 10 million who used the railway, and 2 million - by water. But many left the battle areas on cars and horse-drawn vehicles, on foot. As the occupied territories were liberated from the fascist troops, many returned back: some of them were drafted into the army, some died. Data on the movements of the population of the second half of the 40s, when the scale of reverse migration, is also unknown. These factors are not measurable. And based on them, estimates of the population are made up to the 1959 census. We add that for areas where the population migrated during the war years, estimates of human losses, especially by the method of demographic balance, are overstated, and for areas that have accepted migrants, they are underestimated.

Traditional methods of estimating human losses

1. The method of proportional distribution of losses.This method assumes that losses in all parts of the population are distributed equally intensely. But this condition is absent in calculating the loss of life of the USSR: not all union republics were fully or partially occupied. In addition, the data on the deaths of civilians in the occupied territories and those hijacked to work in Germany (“Ostarbeiters”) differ significantly depending on the time the territory was in the hands of the enemy, the fierce fighting, the magnitude of the resistance, and, consequently, the severity of punitive operations . The nature of the battles in different parts of the country was significantly different. The siege of Leningrad, the defense of Stalingrad, the battle on the Kursk Bulge differ from the defense of Brest or Sevastopol not in the bitterness and stamina of soldiers, but in scale, which the proportional distribution of losses cannot take into account. Therefore, it would be wrong to simply distribute civilian casualties by the specific gravity of the inhabitants of territories under occupation, and military personnel by the share of Union republics in the country's population.

According to the ChGK data, in territories that have been under occupation for a long time (group 1), the recorded (apparently, very underestimated) share of persons exterminated by the Nazis amounted to 4% of the pre-war population. About 8.4% of the population in these areas was stolen in Germany. In territories that were briefly or partially under occupation (group 2), slightly less than one percent died. Together with those stolen for forced labor, this gives 1.5%, i.e. almost 8.3 times less than the first group of territories. There are also significant differences within groups in the deaths of civilians and their removal to forced labor. In the first group - the Leningrad (28.3% of the population died and stolen in Germany), Pskov (17.4%), Novgorod (15.7%), Bryansk (12.7%) and Smolensk (8.5%) regions . In the second - Oryol (7.7%) and Volgograd (5.8%) regions.

To apply the method of proportional distribution of the death toll, it is necessary, in addition to the total amount of losses (separately for military personnel and the civilian population), also data on the population in the pre-war and post-war years. This information allows us to calculate the rate of change in the population separately for groups of districts that have been under occupation for a long and short time. The rate of population decline in such territories of Russia in the post-war years is higher than in the Union republics that were captured by the enemy (in total). Even by 1959, the population of these Russian territories did not reach the level of 1939. The rate of change in the population by region groups was significantly different. The areas of the 1st group suffered the most during the war. In 1959, the population here was 15% lower than the pre-war. Obviously, distributing casualties in proportion to the share of civilians in the occupied territories is also incorrect.

For the calculation, you can take the formula: RP \u003d (OP x TO x DR): TP. Where: RP ? losses of the civilian population of Russia, OP - total losses of the civilian population, TO - the rate of change in the population of all regions that were under occupation, DR - the share of Russia in the population of the occupied territories, TR - the rate of change in the population of Russian regions that were in the occupation. Two calculation options are possible: according to population dynamics 1939 - 1951 and 1939 - 1959. In the first case, the loss of civilian population in Russia will amount to 6.694 thousand people. In the second - 6.969 thousand. Although both calculation options are significantly affected by the results of the migration movement of the population (in 1939 - 1950 and in 1939 - 1958), they give similar results - 6.7 - 7 million people without the death of military personnel.

2. The method of direct counting.The use of this method restricts cash information, since its use in its pure form requires complete information about the deceased civilian population and military personnel. In practice, it is necessary to combine a direct account with a proportional distribution of part of the total losses for the country. In this way, calculations of civilian casualties were performed in two versions.

Option 1. Information on the deaths of civilians in the occupied areas collected by the ChGK was published by A.A. Shevyakov. 5591 thousand people were exterminated on the territory of Russia (P. Polyan - 656 thousand people). In total for the USSR, this figure is 11,309 thousand people. Thus, Russia accounted for 49.4%, provided that the share of the population living in the occupied territories of Russia was less than 1/3; more than - 3/5 of all respondents the population was in the occupation for long. In addition to the death of the population during the fighting and occupation, part of it was stolen by fascists for forced labor. In total, 4129 thousand people were stolen from the so-called ostarbeiters from the Soviet Union, of which 1269 thousand from Russia - 30.7%. According to V.N. Zemskov in March 1946 repatriated to the USSR 2591 thousand. Ostarbeiters. The dispute over the number of those remaining in the West is not crucial for calculations. It is important - how many people were taken out and how many returned (about 63%). Obviously, the percentage of returnees is not the same for different regions of the former USSR. The shares of the dead and not returning ostarbeiters are not the same. If Russian migrant workers behaved in captivity in the same way as immigrants from other parts of the country, with a proportional distribution, Russia accounts for almost 0.5 million non-returning (mostly dead) migrant workers. That is, the number of dead civilians in Russia is approximately 6.1 million people.

Option 2. To assess all civilian casualties, it is necessary - in addition to the 5.6 million accounted for ChGK - to apportion the unaccounted losses proportionally. Having agreed that all the losses of the civilian population of the USSR are 18.3 million people, and the registered ChGK - 11.3 million, it turns out that among the unaccounted for (dead ostarbeiters, displaced persons, etc.), 7 million civilians remain. The proportion of Russia in the number of exterminated and perished population, according to the ChGK, is 49.4%. It accounts for unaccounted losses of the civilian population with a proportional distribution of approximately 3.458 million, and the total losses of the civilian population of Russia are close to 9 million.

3. The method of demographic balance. This method calculated the loss of life of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. Its application presupposes the availability of comparatively reliable information about the population at the beginning and end of the war, about those born in the war years, natural mortality for the same period, and the balance of inter-republican migration. On the population at the beginning and end of the war there are data from the statistical agencies of the USSR (Russia) and estimates by EM Andreeva, L.E. Darsky and T.L. Kharkov (below ADH). The differences between these data are that the latter correct the pre-war figures downward, while simultaneously increasing the number of the post-war population, including even census data. The adjustment of the pre-war figures is based on the fact that the pre-war census overestimated the population. The figures of the post-war years are increased for births and deaths on the basis of amendments to the incompleteness of registration. True, such an amendment for 1946 - 50 years. gives an increase in natural growth of only 0.2 million people. The remaining 0.8 million (the difference in 1946 is one million people), apparently, refer to the amendments for migration. Migration is the Achilles heel of all amendments, as well as demographic forecasts.

ADH for 1946 - 50 years. summarize information on inter-republican migration, incomplete and not accurate. We had to write that the records of destinations and actual points of arrival are not the same thing. Moving and registration do not coincide in time. Many circumstances affect the accuracy of accounting for population migration even at the present time, and in fact we are talking about the first post-war years. Of those who arrived in urban settlements in Russia in 1946, those who arrived “from nowhere” accounted for 74%. Is it possible to reliably judge population size with such data on migration, and even with an accuracy of thousands of people? Population adjustments, if the data are not designed to calculate human losses, be it war or repression, are harmless in themselves. But since the ADH has underestimated the initial and overestimated final population in comparison with the data of statistical agencies, this guarantees the lowest results of estimates of human losses. If according to the data of statistical agencies the population of Russia from 1941 to 1946 decreased by 14.9 million people, according to ADH data by 13.5 million. For subsequent calculations, we will take as option 1 the difference obtained according to the statistics, and how option 2 - ADH data.

The resulting values \u200b\u200b(14.9 and 13.5 million people) will increase by the number of births in 1941 - 1945. To do this, we will use the birth data in 1936-1940 and 1946 - 1950. and information about those who survived to the age of 42–28 years by 1979. The number of those born during the war years can be determined by the average share equal to their half-sum for two adjacent groups (1936–40 and 1946–50). up to 37 - 33 years old will be 0.7. If, as the initial data for calculating this coefficient, we take the shares of those who survived until 1979 to 39–38 years old (born in 1939–40) and to 32–31 years old (birth years 1946–47), its value will be 673. Then the number born in 1941 - 45 years. in the first case there will be 8.6 and in the second - 8.9 million people.

Those born in the prewar and war years were partially exterminated during the occupation. Therefore, the proportion born in 1946 is 50, 1951 is 55 and 1956 is 60. and who reached the age of 42–38, 37–33, and 32–28 years old by the 1989 census than those who reached this age by 1979. They are 0.792, 0.862, and 0.934, respectively, if the proportion of people who have reached the same age in 1979 and 1989, divided one into another, the following ratios will be obtained: for people aged 42–38 years — 1,361, aged 37–33 years — 1,231, and aged 32–28 years — 1,140. It is difficult to assume that the mortality rate of those born during the war is lower than that of children born on the eve of the war. Therefore, the ratios 1.231 - 1.281 are clearly underestimated, as are the initial coefficients of 0.7 and 0.673. If we take the excess coefficients of 1.361, the proportion of those born during the war years and who lived to 37 - 33 years old by 1979 will be 0.634, and the number of born in 1941 - 45 years - 9.5 million people. If the difference between the population in 1941 and 1946. add the number of births (let’s take 9 million, the average is between 8.6 and 9.5), we get for the 1st option the initial value of further calculations at 23.9 million and for the 2nd option - 22.5 million.

In these numbers ? Three values \u200b\u200bare not known: natural mortality, migration growth (decrease), and actually human losses. Most often, when determining the natural population decline, published indicators of natural growth in 1940 or 1939 are used. and in the postwar years. The most accessible indicators of natural population growth in 1940 and 1950. The natural population growth in Russia in 1940 was 12.4 per 1000 population and in 1950 it was 16.8. For the war years, they take average values, in this case, the figure is 14.6 per 1000 population, multiplied by 5 (years of war). However, the use of indicators of natural growth in periods adjacent to the war to assess the possible increase in the war years is unreasonable, if only because the birth rate, and, consequently, infant mortality, cannot be accepted in terms of peacetime.

To determine natural mortality in 1941-45. Related period data needed. Hard work E.M. Andreeva, L.E. Darsky, etc. Kharkov made available statistical data on the dead in Russia in the 30-50 years. XX century. In 1936 - 40 years. the number of deaths in Russia amounted to 10,980 thousand people and in 1946 - 50 years. - 5733 thousand. The average of these values \u200b\u200bgives 8.4 million people. But the population in the second half of the 40s is less than in the second half of the 30s. The average annual values \u200b\u200bhere are 106.4 and 99.4 million people, i.e. the first is more than the second by 7%, by which the number of deaths during the war years should be increased. The resulting number of 9 million includes inflated infant mortality. Births in the war years are more than 2 times less than in the previous 5 years. Therefore, the total number of deaths during the war years, even with constant infant mortality rates, should be 1.5–2 million less: approximately 7–7.5 million people.

Thus, the difference between the population in 1941 and 1946, increased by the number of births during the war years, should be reduced by the amount of natural mortality. Obviously, the higher the natural mortality rate, the lower the human loss and vice versa. We will accept 7.5 million people for subsequent calculations. Then, according to the first option, there remains an unallocated balance of 16.4 and according to the second option - 15 million people. These figures include two components: the balance of inter-republican population migration in 1941–4-5. and the loss of Russia in the Great Patriotic War.

Ethnodemographic Method

This method was developed by us and used to estimate the number of migrant workers in Russia. The methods for estimating the number of migrant workers and human losses differ from each other in that in the first case, the number of survivors to this day, which refers to the citizens of Russia, is determined from the totality of migrant workers. In the second, the losses of the population of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War are distributed among the former Soviet republics. The use of the ethnodemographic method involves the use as a starting value of the total human losses for the country. But separate estimates of the loss of civilian population and military personnel are needed. Such figures are accepted - 18.3 and 8.7 million. Losses of the civilian population should be distributed among the Union republics, the territories of which were fully or partially occupied, and the losses of military personnel by the post-Soviet states.

In general, the essence of the ethnodemographic method is that the loss of life for individual parts is determined from the losses of state-forming nationalities. Transferring settlements to ethnic groups eliminates the main informational difficulty: they become unnecessary migration data. Nevertheless, as with the use of traditional methods, the application of the ethnodemographic method encounters information gaps. The main one is that the national composition of the population of the territories that entered the USSR before the war was not determined.

The ethnodemographic method allows you to estimate the loss of life for each of the main ethnic groups and to distribute them in separate parts of the former state. In this case, all calculations are carried out for Russia, although they can be performed for Ukraine, Belarus and other states of the new foreign countries. At the same time, the total losses of the civilian population of Russia are formed from the losses of persons of the main nationalities who are titular for the largest union republics, whose territory was fully or partially occupied.

For calculations, first of all, information is needed on the population and the main nationalities of the republics, which were fully or partially occupied, at the beginning and end of the war. Unfortunately, the first post-war census was carried out at the beginning of 1959. Even worse is the situation with information on the composition of the pre-war population. The latter is available from the 1937 census and can be used without significant adjustment only for Russia. In other republics that were under occupation, it is either incomplete (Ukraine, Belarus), or absent (Baltic States). It can be assumed that the composition of the population of the territories that entered Ukraine and Belarus did not include many representatives of the titular peoples of Russia, and the distribution of the remaining ethnic groups corresponded to the census (1937) structure of the same set of nationalities in the population of these republics. True, it is necessary to exclude a million Poles from the population that has joined Ukraine, an interstate migration exchange carried out at the end of the war. Taking into account its population growth in Ukraine will be not 8.7, but 7.7 million people. Excluding Russians and Belarusians from the population, it turns out that the share of Ukrainians is almost 90%, the rest ? Poles, Jews, Czechs, Hungarians, Moldavians, Romanians, etc. Therefore, the number of Ukrainians at the end of 1939 can be increased by more than 7.8 million. In the same way, the number of Belarusians will increase by 3.1 million. nor in the Baltic, there is, in fact, any information to assess the national composition of the population. But for Russia's loss of life this information is not needed: the share of the titular peoples of these republics is insignificant in the composition of its population.

Two calculation options are possible: the first - the entire number of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians who lived before the war in the USSR is accepted, and the second - only their number in the republics that were under occupation. The number of Ukrainians, Belarusians and other peoples living in the occupied territories includes the population of the regions joined on the eve of the war (20.1 million). As a result, at the beginning of 1937 the number of Ukrainians and Belarusians, respectively, increased by 6.1 and 2.8 million people.

Applying the formula described when using the method of proportional distribution of human losses, we obtain, regardless of the calculation options, estimated values \u200b\u200bfor the main nationalities. Then this information is distributed in proportion to the share of Russia in the number of people of a given nationality in the USSR in 1937. The figure of 7.4 million received is the loss of civilian population. To these must be added the losses of servicemen attributable to Russia. Since the total military losses for the USSR proposed by the military department have been adopted, it remains to take on faith the information that relates to the distribution of these losses by republic and nationality. Detailed information about both is given in the article by G.F. Krivosheeva. According to these data, Russia accounts for 7.9 million dead military personnel — 66.3% of the total losses for the USSR. This figure is taken from the losses of 11.9 million people. If we accept that the share of Russia in irretrievable losses (8668.4 million) is also 66.3%, their value will amount to 5.7 million people. With a proportional distribution of losses (the share of Russia in the population of the USSR before the war - 56.4 - 56.8%), it would have accounted for 4.9 million troops.

The irretrievable losses attributable to Russia can be calculated using the ethno-demographic method (Table 1).

Table I

Assessment of irretrievable losses of military personnel

(share of Russia)

Nationalities	Irretrievable losses (thousand people)	The proportion of persons given nationality - residents	Irretrievable losses (thousand people)
Ukrainians
Belarusians

The irretrievable losses of military personnel related to Russia obtained using the ethno-demographic method turned out to be 0.1 million more than those obtained by recalculating the data on the losses of Russia cited by G.F. Krivosheev.

Estimation of Russia's loss of life inWorld War II

The results of the estimates of human losses in the war years, obtained using various methods, are presented in table 2.

table 2

Human assessmentlossesdifferent

methods (thousand. people)

	Civilian casualties	Military casualties	All human losses
Proportional, two options
Direct, two options
Balance, two options
Ethnodemographic

Analysis of these data allows us to draw a number of conclusions. Firstly, in our opinion, the approximate value of Russia's casualties in the Great Patriotic War is about 13 million people. It would be naive to claim greater accuracy with the initial information that can be available at present. Although the share of Russia in the loss of life of the USSR is 48.5%, it is not as large as the proportion of the federation in the total population loss for the country during the war years. The population of the Soviet Union from 1940 to 1951 decreased by 12.5 million people, including Russia's share - 57.3% (7.2 million).

Secondly, taking this figure of human losses and estimates obtained by the method of demographic balance, we can determine the results of inter-republican migration during the war years. In 1941 - 1945 Russia's population has increased due to forced migration by between 1.9 and 3.3 million people. The second figure is more real. Apparently, there were more migrants, but some of them returned as the exit sites became free, the other migrated to the rear, to the Union republics, etc.

Thirdly, the remaining 14 (without the Karelian-Finnish) union republics account for 3 million casualties; 6 republics, the territory of which was occupied for a long time, lost 10.9 million civilians. Note that in the total population decline of the USSR (from 1940 to 1951), Ukraine accounted for 33%, Belarus - 10.1%, the Baltic states, Moldova - 2.6%. These figures are very different from the distribution of civilian casualties cited by P. Polyak. He has a share of Russia - 10.8%, Ukraine - 52%, Belarus - 22.4%, etc. . According to him, Russia has lost 1.3 million civilians. Then it turns out that other republics - 17 million, provided that the number of their population by the beginning of 1951 was reduced by only 5.3 million people ?!

Fourthly, in the loss of life of the Soviet Union, Russia accounts for 2/3 of dead military personnel and 2/5 of the civilian population. The scale of Russia's losses, their distribution between the civilian population and the military (56% and 44%) does not correspond to that in the USSR (68% and 32%), especially in other republics (78% and 22%). if Russia's losses are attributed to its population in 1940, it turns out that they make up 11.9% compared to 13.9% in the country as a whole. However, irretrievable losses of military personnel in the country make up 4.5%, and in Russia - 5.2%. Similar comparisons for the civilian population should come from the fact that not all of Russia was in occupation. In the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, civilian casualties amounted to 21%. In Russia - 24.3%. One in four is lost. There is no such thing in any European country!

The scale of human losses in Russia and their distribution between the civilian population and the military are explained by several reasons. One of them is that on the western borders of the USSR from the Barents to the Black Sea, the first losses were suffered by border guards and military districts (on the first day of the war they were converted to fronts), to a large extent manned by conscripts from Russia. During the 3rd and 4th quarters of 1941, the losses of the Red Army reached 3 million people — 99% of the average monthly personnel; 1942 was no easier. During the 1.5 years of the war, the Red Army lost 6 million people. Losses in subsequent years were not only less (about 4 million in 2.5 years), but also declined: 30.9%, 21.6% and 10.0% in January-May 1945. Until 1943, the main losses carried by Russia. Its share in the irretrievable losses of the Red Army was: in 1941 - 65% of the all-Union, in 1942 - 77.1% and in 1943 - 69.5%. Later, when the battles took place mainly in Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states and Moldova, then outside the USSR and appeals began in the liberated areas, Russia's share in irretrievable losses fell: 1944 - 51.8%, 1945 - 50.9%. Thus, the losses of Russian soldiers occur in the years when the country's armed forces suffered the most damage.

The second reason is related to the first. The intensity of the call for replenishment from Russia during the war years was generally higher than from other republics. During the war years, military commissariats called on 22.7% of Russian citizens, about 17%? citizens of the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, 12.5% \u200b\u200b- Ukraine and 12% - Belarus. There are several explanations. Some republics in 1943 - 1944 were fully or partially occupied, in others there was a different age composition of the population and the level of its socialization. There were other reasons.

According to G.F. Krivosheeva, during the war years, 29.6 million people were mobilized throughout the Soviet Union, which, together with personnel military personnel, amounted to 34.5 million. In Russia, he said, every fifth "put on an overcoat" was called up for military service. Thus, the share of Russia among those called up for the country is 84.5%. At the same time, the loss of military personnel in relation to the number mobilized in the remaining republics was 65.2%, and in Russia - 22.8%. These data make obvious the lie associated with the "international" policy of the CPSU: the proportion of soldiers of each nationality was proportional to the share in the country's population. The data of the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense on the national composition of 166 rifle divisions do not confirm this thesis. So, in January-June 1943, the share of Russians in these divisions was 63.8 - 65.6%. But before the war, the share of Russians in the country's population did not exceed 50%. The author of the book is right in that, as the country was liberated, the share of Ukrainians, Belarusians, and some other nationalities increased, while the Russians decreased. In particular, in the same rifle divisions from January 1 to December 31, 1943, the share of Russians fell 6.3 points (64.6 and 58.3%), Ukrainians almost doubled (11.8 and 22.3 %), Belarusians? from 1.9 to 2.7%. This is understandable: mobilization came to the liberated territories. Together with the Russians in 1943, Kazakhs, representatives of the Transcaucasian republics, and, perhaps, the Kyrgyzs, actively replenished the armed forces. It is clear that the thesis of the proportional participation of nations in the war of the Soviet people pursued a noble goal. But a lie? it is a lie, even with good intentions.

Among the reasons for the great loss of civilian life is that large-scale battles, in fact, took place four times in the Russian territories: the Red Army retreated twice in 1941 to Moscow and in 1942 to Stalingrad, and Hitler’s troops were initially driven back from Moscow and then defeated at Stalingrad and on the Kursk. Almost 2 years in the Russian territories there were bloody battles. The Red Army suffered the greatest losses in the summer and fall of 1941 and 1942. Settlements several times passed from hand to hand, many of them were destroyed as a result of bombing and shelling. Soldiers perished, and the civilian population remaining in the settlements died. A significant contribution to the loss of civilian population was made by the siege of Leningrad, which claimed at least 1.5 - 2 million human lives.

The scale of losses among the Russians is connected with racial politics in the captured areas. Russians are most represented among the military and prevailed in the civilian population of the occupied regions of Russia (96 - 98%). Of the total losses of servicemen, Russians accounted for 66.3%, Ukrainians - 15.9%, Belarusians - 2.9%, Tatars - 2.2%, Jews - 1.6%, etc. . According to P. Polyan, in 1941 the enemy captured 58.3% of all prisoners. Among them, immigrants from Russia prevailed, based on the loss structure of the first stage of the war. Of the number of prisoners of 1941, 20% survived to victory, while the survival rate of prisoners of 1944 was 48%. Of course, the length of stay in captivity affected, but most importantly, the composition of prisoners changed. By the way, of the prisoners of war and “ostarbeiters” of the defectors among Russians there were 31.7 thousand, among Ukrainians - 144.9 thousand and Belarusians - 10.0 thousand people. According to the "ostarbeiters" is this for Russia? 1.7%, Belarus - 2.5%, for Ukraine - 6%. Defenders regarding the loss of persons of the same nationalities were 0.5%, 0.6% and 2.2%. The ratio of defectors to the number of repatriated Soviet citizens is as follows: 2%, 1.9%, and 8.8%. The percentage of Ukrainians is largely due to the fact that on the eve of the war, Western territories entered it, whose population did not manage to integrate into new conditions.

The attitude of the occupiers towards the Russians was much worse than, for example, towards the Ukrainians. We refer to P. Polyana, who is far from bias in this matter. In a book that is fundamental from material collected in the German archives, he writes about the Nazis' stake in the beginning of the war on the "superiority" of a Ukrainian to a Russian. Ukrainians were even released prisoners of war; there were other privileges canceled at the end of 1941. Not only Ukrainians, but also the peoples of the Baltic countries, Germans and especially Crimean Tatars were in a more sparing regime. Worse, perhaps, was only the Jews, subject to total destruction. A similar practice was due to the fact that the Nazis at the first stage of the war, counting on its lightning-fast nature, were not ready for such a number of prisoners. Therefore, in 1941, 318.8 thousand people were released from captivity, including - 277.8 thousand Ukrainians. Having soon abandoned such measures, in 1943 they returned to them: they released those who joined security and other groups — before May 1944, more than 0.8 million prisoners of war.

Naturally, the peoples of the Soviet Union are not to blame for the fact that such a fate fell on the lot, first of all, of the Russian people. It so happened that the main battles of the first stages of the war, when losses were especially great, went on the territory of Russia. The peoples of the USSR are not guilty of the fact that the Nazis, trying to destroy the friendship of peoples, pursued a differentiated policy, not counting the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians as full-fledged nations. We are not talking about the peculiar national policy of the leadership of the USSR and much more. This is ours general story. It should not be distorted, no matter how painful it is.

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Russia entered the third millennium in the face of a decline in its population. This process began in the first half of the 90s. Even earlier, since 1986, the overall population growth began to decrease. Already in 1991, the total population growth was less than in 1986 by almost 8 times. Since that time, the population of Russia has practically stopped growing. 1992 is the beginning of a long, protracted period of depopulation. From that time until 2001, inclusive, the average annual number of deaths exceeded the number of births by 777 thousand people, moreover, in the last three years, by 943 thousand.

Table 1

The dynamics of the natural movement of the population of Russia in 1992-2001. (thousand people)

As can be seen from table 1, due to the natural decline in the country's population, its number decreased over the decade (1992-2001) by almost 7.8 million people. However, as a result of positive migration growth (the influx, first of all, of the Russian-speaking population from the republics of the former Soviet Union), the total decline was 1.6 times less. Since 1993, the natural population decline has been at a consistently high level and the extent of the population decline has depended entirely on the balance of external migration. Since 1994 there is a sharp decrease in the balance of external migration. In 1999-2001 its value compared to 1993-95gg. decreased by more than 3.3 times, which significantly increased the overall decline in the country's population. In the past three years, the Russian population has declined annually by 750-800 thousand people, whereas in 1993-95. - a little more than 330 thousand

table 2

Dynamics of natural, migratory and total population growth (decrease) in 1992-2001
(thousand people) *

*) between tables 1 and 2 there are discrepancies in the numbers of natural population decline. Both figures are taken from the same official publications of the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation.

**) Data are preliminary.

The first year of the new century, as well as the last year of the last century, did not improve the demographic dynamics of the last ten years. The number of births, although slightly increased, is connected with two opportunistic circumstances: firstly, women born in the eighties entering the most active reproductive ages (in that period, the number of births was 2.3-2.5 million, compared to 1.6- 1.2 million in the nineties) and, secondly, with that. that the implementation of the reproductive plans of these women no longer depends on the demographic policies that were implemented in the Soviet Union in the eighties. These measures, as is known, created a powerful demographic wave, the crest of which reached the level of 2.5 million births per year (1983.1987), and the largest failure occurred in 1999.

The beginning increase in the birth rate does not yet inspire hope that Russia has reached the “bottom” from which the birth rate rise will begin. The Demographic Pit expects Russia after 2010. In addition, there have not yet been any noticeable changes in the birth rate: the total fertility rates remain extremely low (do not exceed 1.2 children).

In 2000-2001 the number of deaths after a short period of slight decline and then a sharp increase in 1999, increased again. According to the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation, the number of deaths was 2225 and 2252 thousand, respectively. The natural decline was the largest for the entire depopulation period (958 and 943 thousand people). With a further reduction in migration growth, the population of Russia by 2001. decreased by 760 thousand and by 2002 dropped to the mark of 144 million people. Over the decade of depopulation (1992-2001), the country's population decreased by 4.7 million people. Do not have a positive foreign migration balance, the population of Russia by the beginning of 2002. would barely exceed 141 million people.

In the figures given, when compared with the modern demographic dynamics of most Western European countries, there is nothing to worry about. In depopulation mode, a rather significant number live developed states. Actually, the prospect of population decline, according to UN forecasts, seems to be the most likely scenario for the entire European region by the middle of the 20th century. According to estimates made in 2001 by the UN Economic and Social Council, until 2050. in 33 European countries with a population exceeding 140 thousand people will be reduced in number. Within half a century, the population of Europe may decrease by 133 million people, including in Russia by 28.3%, in Ukraine - by 39.6% and Belarus - by 18.5%. Russia will account for more than 30% of the total reduction, although its share in the total population of the countries in question is only 22%.

Outwardly similar processes in Russia and developed countries have fundamentally different nature. The bottom line is that depopulation in Russia, as in Ukraine and Belarus, occurs under double pressure. Firstly, it is due to the uniquely low birth rate even by the standards of developed countries (the total birth rate is 1.2–1.3 at a level necessary even for a simple reproduction of the population of 2.15). Secondly, and most importantly, it is determined by a catastrophically high mortality rate. Analogs to Russian mortality rates can be found only among underdeveloped countries (currently the average life expectancy in Russia is 12-15 years lower than in most European countries).

Therefore, the severity of the depopulation situation in Russia is formed not only due to the narrowing of the reproduction base (low birth rate), but, first of all, due to the high costs (super-mortality). Compared with the group of depopulation European countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, etc.), where the natural decline is 0.1-0.7 per 1000 population, the Russian depopulation parameters (4.8, 6.4 and 6.7 per 1000 population, respectively, in 1998 , 1999 and 2000) are ten times larger. Moreover, in four of the seven most developed countries of the world, a steady natural population growth is maintained at fertility levels close to Russia: in the UK - 1.6; France -3.4; Canada - 4.8 and the United States - 5.6 ppm.

The onset of depopulation in Russia is caused by a number of factors that have both a fundamental (long-term) and market character. Fundamental factors i.e. the current parameters of the population (age structure) and its reproduction are such that in the 21st century they will affect the reduction in the population of Russia. The effect of market factors, both in relation to fertility (a timing shift under the influence of family assistance measures in the eighties), and in relation to mortality (a decrease under the influence of anti-alcohol campaign measures and subsequent compensatory growth) almost completely exhausted itself by the second half of the 90s. Against this background, the influence on the reproductive processes of such a conjunctural, albeit protracted, factor as the systemic crisis in Russia, which undermined the country's economy and essentially destroyed social infrastructure. The ongoing changes in the marital and family sphere (changes in the age of marriage, an increase in the number of people who are in informal marriages, an increase in illegitimate births, etc.) are largely caused by socioeconomic and political transformation in the country.

The increase in mortality and the deterioration of public health are the main negative consequences of the Russian version of socio-economic reforms. As a result of the crisis, the majority of the population of Russia: the regime, quality and nutrition structure worsened, in particular, meat, fish, vegetables and fruits were replaced by bread, potatoes, cereals (for example, in 91-95 with an increase in per capita potato consumption by 14 kg., the consumption of meat and meat products decreased by 22 kg., fish and fish products –– 1.7 times, etc.). During the reform period, opportunities to use the services of the spa complex decreased (the number of spa organizations by 1999 decreased by almost 2.5 thousand compared to 1990), health care (due to the high cost - the unavailability of medicines, qualified medical services, etc. ) It should be added that throughout the nineties the population was regularly subjected to stresses (selling prices, depreciating deposits, financial fraud, fear of unemployment and poverty, the August financial meltdown, numerous terrorist acts, the permanent fight against terrorism, criminal and bureaucratic lawlessness, etc.).

Based on the current regime of population reproduction: European fertility and African mortality, forecasts are being made of Russia's demographic future. According to various forecasts, in Russia, at least in the first half of the 21st century, a natural population decline will be observed. So according to the forecast of the Goskomstat of the Russian Federation (1998, medium version), the population of the country by 2015. will decrease by almost 8 million and amount to 138.4 million people. According to the calculations of 2000. by the beginning of 2016 the estimated population will be 134.4 million. The forecast, made in 1998. demographic services of the UN, predicts a reduction in the population of Russia by 2025. by 9.5 million and by 2050 - by 26.1 million (according to the forecast of 2000, the average variant - will decrease by 41 million people). The population of Russia in the middle of the 21st century will be less than the current population of neighboring Japan. In accordance with this forecast, Russia from the 8th place in the world in terms of population is currently moving to 14th place in 2050.

Obviously, not all, and possibly no forecasts, will come true exactly, all the more so as they vary significantly among all the departments that regularly comprise them. But for understanding the situation, it is not the numerical results of the forecasts that are important, but the demographic dynamics, which is negative for all forecast options and indicates a steady decline in the population of Russia due to its natural decline, in which, and it must be emphasized once again, super-mortality plays a dominant role. It is bitter to realize, but in 1992-2000, i.e. during the period of socio-economic reforms, the number of deaths exceeded the same indicator for the same period of the eighties (1982-1990) by 5 million people. The excess would be even greater if the birth rate remained at the level of the 70s, and even more so, the 80s. In the 90s only due to super-mortality, i.e. exceeding the age-specific mortality rates in this decade compared to the same for the 80s, Russia lost about 3 million people. Note that during the war years 1941-1945. supermortality amounted to 4.2 million people (who died of starvation and other deprivations).

The nineties is not only the period of the beginning and deepening of depopulation in Russia. At this time, the migration situation in the country worsened significantly. There were new problems that were not previously known, while traditional migration processes ceased to meet the national interests of the state. This happened as a result of new factors (the collapse of the USSR, the replacement of the planned distribution of productive forces with market mechanisms for the distribution of labor and capital, the emergence of ethnic conflicts, etc.). They mainly negatively affect many aspects of the development of the Russian Federation.

First of all, inter-republican exchange was transformed into a population migration exchange between Russia and the independent states of the new foreign countries. Note that in the last quarter of the twentieth century, Russia in migration exchange with the former Soviet republics constantly had a positive population growth. During the first half of the seventies and in the eighties, Russia received at least 2.5 million people in an inter-republican migration exchange. These processes were not only preserved, but also intensified in the nineties (Table 3).

Table 3

Migration exchange between Russia and the new foreign countries (thousand people)

Years	Arrived	Retired	Balance	CRMS *
1991	692.1	587.2	104.9	848
1992	925.7	570.0	355.7	616
1993	922.9	369.1	553.8	400
1994	1191.3	345.6	845.7	290
1995	866.9	347.3	519.6	401
1996	631.2	191.4	439.8	303
1997	582.8	149.5	433.4	256
1998	494.8	133.0	361.8	269
1999	366.7	129.7	237.0	354
2000	350.3	83.4	266.9	238

* The coefficient of the effectiveness of migration ties, in the past, the percentage of feedback, is the ratio of those who leave to arrivals, per mille.

A constant migration influx favorably affects the demographic development of Russia. In 1992-2000 The positive migration balance was formed, first of all, from the Russian-speaking population remaining in the states of the new foreign countries. For 1992-2000 the country's population has increased due to migrants from the new foreign countries by more than 3.3 million people. The actual balance of external migration was less due to the outflow of the population to the states of the old foreign countries. Among migrants who arrived from the new foreign countries in the last decade, the proportion of people under 16 was 5 points higher than in the Russian population (approximately 27 and 22 percent). In addition to holding back the pace of demographic aging, migrants also participated in the reproductive process. During this period, approximately 45-50 thousand children were born to them, already citizens of Russia.

Obviously, in the first decade of the twentieth century, the pace of further reduction in the country's population will be largely determined by the scale of the influx of migrants. Despite the decrease in the number of peoples of Russia - Russians, Tatars, Komi, Kabardins and others who remained in the new foreign countries, their migration potential is still quite high (in 1989, 28 million Russians and other peoples of Russia lived in the Union republics, and currently - about 22-23 million.) Only 6-6.5 million are left of Russians in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan alone. A reduction in the scale of migration of Russians and other peoples of Russia from these and a number of other states of the new foreign countries, as well as a decrease in migration growth in the Russian population as a whole , occurred in the 90s, are caused, on the one hand, by the liberalization of the attitude towards the Russian-speaking population (linguistic and other indulgences) and, on the other hand, by the fact that migrants in the historical homeland did not receive adequate support until recently, due to the lack of consistent migration policies regarding compatriots remaining abroad. The experience, for example, of post-war Germany and France, testifies to the enormous political and economic gain of these countries, which returned their compatriots from the territories they left.

The influx of the Russian-speaking population from the new foreign countries in the current decade, with the corresponding migration policy of Russia, can be from 3 to 5 million people. This influx of migrants from the new foreign countries will significantly slow down the decline in the population of Russia. In subsequent years, the migration potential may be completely exhausted. The population that has grown old and has become pensioners and those who are born and undergo socialization outside their historical homeland are unlikely to emigrate to Russia on any significant scale.

The changes that have taken place in the socio-economic and political development states that emerged in the post-Soviet space, simplification of the order of entry into Russia, the "transparency" of state borders, led to a sharp increase in the scale of immigration, especially illegal. Most immigrants come to Russia from countries of the old foreign countries (Africa, the Near and Middle East, Southeast Asia). The lack of effective immigration control over the entry and exit of foreigners from Russia does not allow us to give any exact figure of illegal migration. The available estimates of 1-1.5 or more million people are far from the truth. A number of states neighboring Russia are secretly encouraging an increase in their diasporas in its border regions. Immigrants who arrived as tourists, by invitation, etc., then go to an illegal position. The illegal influx of foreign citizens has also increased, some of which use Russia as a transshipment base for subsequent immigration to the states of the old foreign countries. About 40% of immigrants are believed to be in transit.

Illegal immigration has a significant impact on the economic situation in Russia and its social sphere. Illegal migrants are predominantly employed in the shadow economy, replenish criminal structures, evade taxes, exert pressure on the labor market due to their disempowerment and low earnings, worsen the epidemiological situation.

Aggravation of immigration problems, including and illegal, firstly, due to the lack of a legal framework adequate to Russian realities to regulate, as is customary in all developed countries, the volumes of immigration (quotas), the stay of foreign citizens and stateless persons in the country, their legal expulsion or integration into Russian society. Secondly, the penetration of foreigners into the territory of Russia is facilitated by the fact that a significant part of the state border with the countries of the new foreign countries is open, there is no visa regime and legislation on combating illegal immigration is not regulated within the CIS.

Entering into the country from underdeveloped countries, mainly unskilled immigrants from an uncharacteristic Russia ethnoculture, is opposed by a different flow: highly skilled young people emigrating from the country mainly to the USA, Germany and Israel, a significant proportion of which are technical and creative intelligentsia. In 1992-2000 849 thousand people emigrated from Russia to the old abroad. In addition to demographic and intellectual losses, this is a capital drain.

The situation with immigration can be corrected through a sharp increase in international labor migration. It is necessary, while reducing immigration, primarily illegal, to stimulate the attraction and use in Russia of the labor of foreign citizens. Migrants under employment contracts in no way affect the level of Russian unemployment. The total number of officially registered foreign workers does not exceed 0.4% of the total number of employees in the country's economy. True, it is believed that the volume of illegal labor migration is from 3.5 to 5 million people. But who is included in this number is hard to say.

By increasing the scale of international labor migration of Russian citizens, the situation with emigration can be improved. In 1994-2000, the volume of labor migration through state-controlled channels increased by about 5 times. Nevertheless, it remains approximately half the size of the emigration. Obviously, with the active support of the state, labor migration can become a counterweight to the irrevocable emigration of Russians. However, at present, the state has little control over the activities of organizations hiring workers to carry out labor activities, and does not counteract violations of the rights of Russian citizens during their stay abroad.

The least attention during the last ten years has been given to internal migrations both in the field of their research and in the sphere of management, although these migrations are most significant in the geopolitical sense for Russia. Since the beginning of the 90s of the last century, negative trends began to dominate in Russian migrations. For hundreds of years, areas of the Asian part of the country rich in natural resources and occupying an advantageous geopolitical position have been consistently populated. But in the 90s, as a result of the elimination of the state from the regulation of migration, a decrease in the number and density of the population of these territories began. If in the past the population of the European North, Siberia and the Far East was constantly growing at a faster rate than the population of the country as a whole (between the censuses of 1979 and 1989, the population growth rate in these regions exceeded the national average by 2 times), then in the 90s the rate of decline the populations of these four economic regions were higher than in Russia as a whole by almost 6 times. Over the decade, the population of the northern and eastern regions decreased by 1.1 million people.

In 1991-2000, only the European North and Northeast lost more than 900 thousand people as a result of migration. Behind this figure is the destruction of the demographic and labor potential created from many generations of migrants who have undergone difficult biomedical adaptation and gained experience in extreme conditions. The most alarming situation is in the Magadan Region and the Chukotka Autonomous Region, whose population was from 1989 to 2000. decreased by 1.8 times. But these territories can become just as vulnerable in modern world, like Alaska in the middle of the twentieth century.

Migration problems in border areas stretching along the river are even more topical. Argun, Amur and Ussuri. Over 150 years has been their settlement. With great difficulty, a permanent population was created in this area. Now it leaves the border areas. Over the past 10 years, the migration loss of the population in the strip from the Chita Region to the Primorsky Territory amounted to 200 thousand people. The outgoing population is being replaced by immigrants from neighboring countries. So far, this unregulated process is in its infancy, but its possible completion can be predicted by looking at the history of the former Mexican territories that became US states.

Until now, the problems of forced migration remain extremely acute. The country has approximately 300 thousand IDPs with Russian citizenship and the right to state support. Two-thirds of them stand in line for housing and one-third - to receive an interest-free repayable loan for its construction. The unsolved problems of receiving, maintaining, adapting, providing assistance and support to internally displaced persons creates a negative attitude towards state power and hinders the influx of migrants from the new foreign countries. Particular attention is required to address the protracted issues of the return of displaced persons from the Chechen Republic and some other conflict zones in the North Caucasus. . This is not a large-scale, but painful, grief and unhappiness to people problem.

The disadvantage of the migration situation as well as the deepening of depopulation in Russia are not reduced only to the problems of changing the directions of migration flows, reducing the balance of external migration, reducing the population and worsening its structure. Their essence is not in numbers. Ultimately, it is not so important how much the population will decrease and in what part of the country it will live. The significance of these problems is determined by the strategic consequences, possible changes in the structure of the population, the extent to which the country can successfully implement programs of socio-economic development. It should be borne in mind that Russia is the largest country in the world by the size of its territory (it occupies 1/6 of the land). She owns the largest uninhabited or poorly populated spaces on the globe with significant resource potential. The immediate demographic environment of the country (proximity to the overpopulated states of Central Asia and the Pacific) makes these spaces very vulnerable in the context of globalization of world relations.

Maintaining a stable equilibrium in a multi-polar world requires Russia, as a Great Nuclear Power, to maintain its defense potential at a level that meets modern realities. This requires the appropriate armed forces, border troops and other power structures, the acquisition of which is carried out at the expense of the younger generations. As a result of depopulation, primarily a sharp decrease in the number of births in the 90s, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, for example, mobilization opportunities for the male population will amount to approximately 0.6 million people, i.e. will be half as much as it is currently.

For the sustainable socio-economic development of Russia throughout the first half of the 21st century, improving the demographic and migration situation will be of great importance. But not only that. It is also important to reasonably counteract the uneven dynamics of the population, smoothing out the effects of the demographic wave on various aspects of society. The significance of the latter is due to the fact that Russia, like other former union republics, in which the demographic transition has largely ended, will reap the consequences of a rather steep demographic wave in peacetime for many years. It differs markedly from the demographic wave related to the military and the first post-war years. Then the increase in fertility followed its decline during the war years. This circumstance, together with the deformation of the age structure, significantly reduced the intensity of demographic aging. In the years 80-90, the demographic wave formed differently: after a significant increase in the birth rate, its even more significant decline came. The numbers of those born in the 90s have halved compared to the 80s. This has accelerated the pace of demographic aging. Most developed countries have long been faced with an aging population. It has become relevant for Russia. Currently, the share of people over working age in the country's population is slightly less than 21%. But even in the conditions of the economic crisis, despite the extremely low standard of living of pensioners, it represents a huge burden for the budget. According to the forecasts of the Goskomstat of the Russian Federation by 2010 the proportion of people over the working age will reach 22.7%, and by 2015 –25.1%.

The consequences of the demographic wave are already felt in all spheres of the country's life. First of all, these are fluctuations in the numbers of all age groups: able-bodied, military-liable, school, reproductive, pre-school, etc. It is enough to give such figures. If in 1989. the number of people under the age of 2 years increased compared to 1979. by 14%, thereby causing an additional need for nurseries, by 1999 it decreased by 53%, and by 2009 again increase by 11%. In the coming decades, young people will face first high and then low competitions in universities, schools with empty and then overcrowded classes, military departments with good and bad draft conditions, the labor market with fluctuations in the number of unemployed, etc. It is obvious that without economic growth it will be difficult to overcome the effects of the demographic wave, an aging population and a reduction in labor potential

An indisputable fact is that the scale and, accordingly, the consequences of depopulation, the worsening migration situation in Russia, largely depend on the attitude of the state and society towards these phenomena and the possibilities of influencing them. There are two alternatives, one of which is the inactive contemplation of these phenomena, moreover, the justification of depopulation by the experience of the demographic development of developed countries in Europe, and the other is the search for opportunities to change the demographic dynamics of Russia and give migrations a favorable direction for the country. In the second case, as the experience of France in the first half of the twentieth century shows, it is necessary for the authorities, capital and society to realize that depopulation poses a threat to the country's national security.

Awareness of the second alternative opens up opportunities for the formulation and solution of a number of fundamental problems. For the first time in Russian practice in September 2001. The government approved the concept of demographic development of the country until 2015. Obviously, a second, more difficult step is needed. Within the framework of the Concept, a consistent program of actions in the field of improving the country's demographic situation should be developed, including at least two blocks of measures: а / to reduce mortality and improve public health; b / creating prerequisites for increasing the birth rate and, accordingly, strengthening the institution of the family; to / to attract migrants from the new foreign countries, belonging to the titular peoples of Russia and those countries whose population has ethno-cultural characteristics, are close to Russian.

First of all, it is necessary to consistently achieve a reduction in the number of deaths, bringing it to the level of at least the 80s. This is not only a geopolitical, but above all, a humanitarian obligation of a socially oriented state. If at the same time efforts are made to increase the balance of external migration to the volumes of the second half of the 90s, then even without changing the numbers and birth rate, prerequisites will be created for stabilizing the population of Russia. We should not forget that Russia, in its current economic condition, attracts compatriots from countries that emerged in the post-Soviet space. The implementation of these two tasks depends primarily on the level of socio-economic development, but it also depends on the extent to which the results of this development will be used to improve the demographic situation in the country.

Changing the birth rate is a much more difficult task. However, this does not mean that it cannot be solved. An example of this is depopulation France at the beginning of the twentieth century, and even the domestic 80s, when the measures taken to stimulate the birth rate made it possible to repay the demographic wave that arose as a result of the war. True, a new wave was created.

Giving migration processes a positive focus is also impossible without the adoption in this sphere of life of the Russian society by legislative and executive bodies authorities of a number of emergency measures. These measures should be aimed at:

• stimulation of the influx of migrants from the new foreign countries and support, first of all in the legal sphere, of compatriots remaining there;
• regulation of immigration from the old foreign countries (quotas, immigration control, expulsion from the country, creation of legal and economic conditions for the integration of immigrants into the Russian population);
• management of labor migration, including both those who come to temporary work in Russia from abroad, and Russian citizens working under contracts outside the country;
• pursuing a protectionism policy regarding flows (scales and places of exit), structure (primarily ethnic) and the resettlement of migrants in the border and those northern territories, the outflow of the population from which runs counter to the national interests of the country;
• substantiation of the boundaries of the permissibility of formation in the border, strategically important areas, diasporas from neighboring countries;
• establishing conditions and terms for resolving the problems of internally displaced persons, refugees and displaced persons: settling in new places, returning to places of permanent residence, attracting new countries to resolve these issues, from where forced migrants arrived in Russia, etc.

Decisions about how we will live in 10-15 years, how our children and grandchildren will live in the future, are made in our time. Naturally, the existing demographic situation it’ll get worse tomorrow if you don’t do anything today. Therefore, it is important that the current stage of modernization of all spheres of Russia's life becomes a search and implementation of what needs to be done in the coming years to improve the demographic situation in the country.